Supreme Court Rulings on Determining the Cartel End Date by Yun, Seong Un et al.
Supreme Court Rulings on Determining 
the Cartel End Date
Seong Un Yun, Sung Ho Moon, and Nam Woo Kim*
Abstract
Since the very nature of cartels is to operate in ways that are undisclosed and difficult to 
track, it is often a matter of heated dispute in courts as to when a cartel has ended or been 
abandoned. Moreover, the cartel duration is a critical issue because it affects not only the level of 
sanctions imposed, but also the damages amount sought against the cartelists. The Korean 
Supreme Court has issued several important rulings regarding this matter, but there still 
remain areas where further guidance and clarification would be beneficial. Thus, this article 
explores the relevant Korean Supreme Court rulings and concludes that it is time for the highest 
court to further articulate the legal test for determining the ending date of a cartel in an effort to 
eliminate legal uncertainty and establish clearer guidance for market participants.
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I. Introduction
A cartel under competition law refers to any group or association 
formed by competing firms to achieve anti-competitive objectives such as 
raising prices or reducing output. A cartel is formed when a group of 
competing firms reaches an express or implied agreement to dampen 
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competition and engage in overt activities in furtherance of the agreement. 
A cartel is generally considered to be the “supreme evil of antitrust”1) 
and is reviewed under the per se rule or equivalent standard of review in 
many countries.2) Owing to its tremendous damage to consumer welfare 
and economic efficiency, a cartel is given the highest enforcement priority 
in most jurisdictions including the Republic of Korea. 
The shortest-lived cartels survived for only a few months, whereas the 
most persistent cartels endured for more than 20 years. For example, a 
cartel formed by a number of producers of peroxides, a chemical used in 
making plastic and rubber products, was found to have lasted for 29 years 
in Europe between 1971 and 1999.3) While it is not clear to what extent cartel 
stability negatively affects the interests of consumers, it is self-evident, 
assuming equal overcharges for the duration of the cartel, that long-lived 
cartels are in general more harmful than short-lived cartels. 
Since most cartels operate in a covert manner and cartel participants are 
often induced to cheat on cartels while avoiding detection, it is not easy to 
pinpoint the exact date on which collusive activities permanently ceased. 
As explored below, the duration of cartels is a critical factor in the 
enforcement of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter 
MRFTA). Therefore, this article will cover Supreme Court decisions on 
determining the cartel end date as it relates to various matters of practical 
importance. 
Chapter II of this article addresses some practical issues relating to the 
duration of cartels, including the cartel end date. Chapter III outlines the 
Supreme Court rulings on determining the cartel end date. Chapter IV 
closes this article by proposing that the present tests be further refined to 
1) Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) 
(noted, as one of the drawbacks of compulsory sharing of essential facilities, that “compelling 
negotiation between competitors may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion”).
2) Certain types of agreements are so likely to harm competition and to have little 
potential for social benefits or efficiencies that they require little or no inquiry into market 
power or actual anticompetitive effects.
3) The cartel was uncovered by Akzo’s confession to the EU Commission. The cartel was 
formed by Akzo, Luperox, and Peroxid Chemie. With a total duration of 29 years, this cartel 
was the longest-lasting cartel ever uncovered by the EU Commission. See European 
Commission, Commission fines member of organic peroxides cartel, available at http://europa.eu/
rapid/press-release_IP-03-1700_en.htm?locale=en. 
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provide legal certainty for market participants and the enforcement agency. 
II.  Practical Issues in Connection with the Duration of 
Cartels
In practice, it is often an important legal issue to determine the duration 
of a cartel or conspiracy because it affects the level of sanctions and damage 
amount that may be sought against the cartelists. More specifically, first of 
all, the duration of the cartel is important in that it allows for the 
determination of the date from which the statute of limitations begins to 
run. Under the MRFTA, the statute of limitations for violations of the 
MRFTA including cartel activity is five years starting from the date on 
which the Korea Fair Trade Commission (hereinafter KFTC), the antitrust 
enforcement agency in Korea, initiates its investigation or, if no investigation 
is initiated, seven years after the alleged cartel conduct ends or is 
completed.4) Thus, depending on when the KFTC initiates its investigation, 
the statute of limitations period can run up to 12 years from the cartel end 
date. Particularly, because the seven-year statute of limitations period 
commences from the cartel end date, in practice, the issue as to when the 
alleged conduct was terminated often becomes a critical point of dispute.5)
Secondly, the cartel duration is important in that it is one of the key 
factors to be considered in calculating the amount of the administrative 
fines to be imposed on the cartelists. The KFTC takes into account various 
aggravating factors, one of which is the conspiracy duration in determining 
the appropriate amount of the administrative fines to be imposed on the 
4) Dogjeomgyuje Mich Gongjeonggeolaee Gwanhan Beoblyul [Monopoly Regulation and 
Fair Trade Act], Act No.13450, Sept. 25, 2015, Article 49 [hereinafter MRFTA]. Prior to its 
amendment in 2012, the statute of limitations for violations of the MFRTA including cartel 
activity was 5 years from the date of termination of the cartel and any investigation by the 
KFTC could not extend the statute of limitations period.
5) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2015Du37396, May 28, 2015 (S. Kor.). The statute of limitations 
continues to run unless the KFTC decision is issued to the defendants. The Supreme Court 
determined that the limitation period had expired because the KFTC decision was delivered 
to the defendants a day late. 
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conspirators.6) Thus, to calculate the fine amount, the KFTC needs to 
determine the cartel start and end dates. 
Thirdly, the KFTC considers the cartel duration in determining whether 
the case should be referred to the Prosecutor’s Office for criminal 
prosecution. The MRFTA grants to the KFTC, the discretionary power to 
file a criminal complaint with the Prosecutor’s Office.7) To exercise this 
statutory power, the KFTC takes into account the cartel duration among 
various factors stipulated in the Guidelines for Criminal Complaint for the 
MRFTA Offenses issued by the KFTC.8)        
Lastly, the cartel duration is an important factor in calculating damages 
suffered by injured parties in civil cases. In civil cases, the amount of 
damages is usually considered to be the overcharge paid by the plaintiff as 
a result of the conspirators’ charging supra-competitive prices during the 
cartel period. 
As explained above, the cartel duration plays a critical role in issues 
related to, among others, statute of limitations, criminal liability and the 
amount of administrative fines and compensatory damages. Accordingly, 
in practice, it is a crucial matter to establish when the alleged cartel activity 
ended. However, this is still a grey area in Korea and the relevant law 
remains unsettled.  This does not mean that the Korean Supreme Court has 
not provided any guidance in this area but, as shown below, the rules it has 
so far provided are unclear in a number of situations. 
III.  Legal Test to Determine CARTEL END DATE: Supreme 
Court Cases
1. Commencement of the Statute of Limitations Period 
A cartel offense is committed when competing firms reach an express or 
6) Article 55-3 of the MRFTA and the Guidelines for Imposition of Administrative Fines.
7) Article 71 of the MRFTA.
8) Dogjeomgyuje Mich Gongjeonggeolaee Gwanhan Beoblyul Deungui Wibanhaengwiui 
Gobale Gwanhan Gongjeonggeolaewiwonhoeui Jichim [Guidelines for Criminal Complaint 
for the MRFTA], Korea Fair Trade Commission Regulation No. 196, July 22, 2014.
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implied agreement to lessen or eliminate competition. No overt act in 
furtherance of the agreement is required to constitute an unlawful 
conspiracy under the MRFTA. Thus, it is a legal question whether the 
statute of limitations period starts to run from the date of the unlawful 
agreement or begins to run anew after each overt act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
The Supreme Court addressed this question in 2006.9) The Court ruled 
that the statute of limitations begins to run anew after each affirmative 
action is taken in furtherance of a conspiracy. Thus, the statute of 
limitations does not begin to run on the date of the conspiratorial 
agreement but on the date when the last overt act taken to achieve the 
purpose of the conspiracy is completed.10) For example, if a group of 
competing firms reached an agreement on January 1, 2015 to divide up the 
market from February 1, 2015, and the parties began to sell the relevant 
product on February 1, 2015 in accordance with such agreement and the 
last sale at supra-competitive pricing was made on December 31, 2015, 
based on the Supreme Court ruling, the statute of limitations would run 
from December 31, 2015 and not from either February 1, 2015 nor January 1, 
2015.11)    
9) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2004Du11275, Mar. 24, 2006 (S. Kor.). The U.S. Supreme Court 
at an earlier time also addressed this question of law. The statute of limitations applicable to a 
criminal violation of the Sherman Act is five years after an offense has been committed. The 
U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601 (1910), rejected the argument that 
despite subsequent acts in furtherance of the agreement, which by themselves were not actionable 
[emphasis added], the statute of limitations should run from the time of the original 
agreement, holding that “if [the defendants] do continue such efforts in pursuance of the plan, 
the conspiracy continues up to the time of abandonment or success.” The U.S. Supreme Court 
in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971) clarified this principle in 
the civil context by stating, “Generally, a cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run 
when a defendant commits an act that injures a plaintiff’s business …. In the context of a 
continuing conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws, […] this has usually been understood to 
mean that each time a plaintiff is injured by an act of the defendants […] the statute of 
limitations runs from the commission of the act. Thus, the statute of limitations runs from the 
commission of each act that is subsequent to the original conspiracy act. The party bringing 
the antitrust action must therefore show that the conspiracy continued into the limitations 
period.” Further, the requirement that the acts be taken in furtherance of the conspiracy 
necessarily leads to a factual inquiry into the actual purpose and scope of the conspiracy.   
10) Regarding abandonment or withdrawal, please see infra Chapter III. 3. 
11) Like the Korean Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 
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On the other hand, in a bid-rigging case, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the statute of limitations begins to run from the date the conspiring parties 
participate in the last tender pursuant to the agreed conspiracy scheme.12) In 
that case, the Seoul Metropolitan Rapid Transit Corporation (SMPTC) 
solicited bids in connection with the construction of a mall project. A 
consortium composed of a few data communications companies 
participated in the bidding process but the bid process initially failed 
because no other party submitted a competing bid. To prevent another bid 
process failure, the consortium members entered into an agreement with 
Lotte Data Communication Company (LDCC) under which LDCC would 
submit token bids or comp bids to enable the consortium to win the bid 
through a second bidding process. Based on such bid-rigging efforts, the 
consortium was ultimately awarded the project from SMPTC. The Court in 
that case held that the bid-rigging conspiracy ended on the date when the 
conspirators participated in the second bid, not on the date of the 
agreement, reasoning that (i) the conspiratorial agreement did not call for 
any other action in furtherance of the agreement other than LDCC’s 
submission of token or comp bids in the second bid and (ii) the 
anticompetitive goal –bid rigging– was achieved by the bid participation.   
The Supreme Court has established the rule that the statute of 
limitations does not begin to run until the purpose of the conspiracy is 
achieved or begins to run anew after each overt act in furtherance of a 
conspiracy. Simply put, the Court’s rule is that the statute of limitations 
starts running from the time of abandonment or success. 
2. Multiple Agreements and Cartel Duration
 
1) Existence of Principal Agreement 
In a case involving certain graphite electrodes manufacturers, the 
Supreme Court addressed the question of when the statute of limitations 
United States v. A-A-A- Elec. Co., 788 F.2d 242 (4th Cir. 1996) held that the statute of 
limitations does not run on conspiracy claims until the last payment for goods delivered 
under the conspiracy has been made. See also United States v. Therm-All, Inc., 373 F.3d 625 
(5th Cir. 2004) (held that the statute of limitations in an antitrust case starts to run from the 
last overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy).
12) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2015Du37396, May 28, 2015 (S. Kor.).
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begins to run in a case where the cartelists entered into one principal 
agreement along with a number of subsequent ancillary agreements.13) 
According to the facts found by the appellate court, a group of firms 
manufacturing and selling graphite electrodes conspired to engage in price 
fixing on a continuous basis by holding a series of meetings. The 
participating firms had a meeting on May 21, 1992 at which the principal 
scheme was formulated containing the details on how to successfully 
elevate prices. Thereafter, a series of meetings (five in total) had been held 
to coordinate their prices for the Korean market. Although no further 
meeting was held after April 1997, their price coordination continued until 
the end of 1997.
The Court clearly held that the statute of limitations does not begin to 
run “until the purpose of the conspiracy is accomplished,” rejecting the 
cartelists’ argument that the statute of limitations should run separately for 
each agreement made by the cartelists. The Court added that the 
subsequent agreements made through a series of meetings should be 
deemed to be parts of the total scheme to accomplish the purpose 
established by the principal agreement made on May 21, 1992. Thus, in case 
a principal agreement exists which provides the basic framework under 
which subsequent agreements are made to coordinate prices, the statute of 
limitations does not begin to run until every aspect of the principal 
agreement agreed to by the conspirators is completed.14)
Nevertheless, the existence of a principal agreement is not a necessary 
factor to prosecute multiple conspiracies as a single cartel offense. As 
described below, the Supreme Court reiterated that a series of agreements 
even if not based on a principal agreement may still constitute a single 
cartel offense.
13) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2004Du11275, Mar. 24, 2006 (S. Kor.).
14) The U.S. approach appears to be different from that of Korea’s. Under the U.S. law, if 
each subsequent meeting to adjust price and output constitutes an actionable violation, it is 
deemed to be independently illegal from the original conspiracy. Obviously, such meeting 
restarts the statute of limitations. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal antitrust Policy: the laW 
oF comPetition and its Practice 634 (3d ed., 2005) (cited Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 
179 (1997)).
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2) Non- Existence of Principal Agreement
In case there is a principal agreement among the cartelists, each of the 
subsequent agreements does not constitute a separate cartel offense. Such 
succeeding agreements are no more than an overt act in furtherance of the 
principal conspiracy. Therefore, if this is the case, the statute of limitations 
starts to run on the date of the final act performed to achieve the purpose of 
the principal agreement.  
The Supreme Court when confronted with the question of whether 
multiple conspiratorial agreements should each be treated as a separate 
conspiracy in case no principal agreement exists held that if the KFTC can 
prove that each act of the cartelists including a series of conspiratorial 
agreements has been conducted to achieve the same unlawful purpose, the 
KFTC may prosecute the multiple conspiracies as a single offense in which 
case the limitations period runs from the final act committed to achieve the 
unlawful purpose.15) For this purpose, the KFTC must prove that the 
subsequent conspiratorial agreements and each overt act in furtherance 
thereof were rendered to achieve the same goal. The conclusion reached in 
making that determination will not be affected by an insubstantial 
deviation from the initial agreement or the change of a member of the 
cartel.
The same issue often appears in bid-rigging cases. In a case where 
multiple agreements were found among the conspirators, the Supreme 
Court recently ruled that each agreement of the conspirators constitutes a 
separate cartel offense, applying the same test discussed above.16) In that 
case, a group of electric cable manufacturers conspired in 1998 to rig bids 
on a procurement project by Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), 
but the electric cable manufacturers failed to engage in bid-rigging and 
ended up submitting competitive bids in the subsequent bids. However, 
upon KEPCO soliciting bids for a new project, the manufacturers gathered 
again in 2000 and made specific measures to avoid the recurrence of the 
bid-rigging failure that occurred in 1999. The appellate court held that 
15) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2007Du3756, Sept. 25, 2008 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 
2008Du16179, Jan. 3, 2009 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Du16339, June 25, 2009 (S. 
Kor.).
16) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2013Du6169, Feb. 12, 2015 (S. Kor.).
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although a more structured agreement was made in year 2000 compared to 
1998, such as adopting methods to prevent cheating, the 2000 agreement 
should be deemed to be a part of the conspiratorial scheme instituted in 
1998 because both agreements are intended to achieve the same unlawful 
purpose. However, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the appellate 
court. The Supreme Court decided that the statute of limitations had 
expired for the 1998 conspiracy because the agreement made in 2000 was 
substantially unrelated to the 1998 agreement by observing that (i) the 
repeated failures to rig bids during 1999 did not represent merely 
temporary cheating behavior but may be deemed be a failed cartel; (ii) the 
2000 agreement departed significantly from the 1998 agreement, and (iii) 
the 1998 agreement did not stipulate a scheme that would  address bid-
rigging failures. The Court concluded that only the 2000 agreement may be 
subject to the KFTC’s review because the 2000 agreement cannot be 
considered to constitute any part of the cartel scheme established under the 
1998 agreement.
In sum, the question of whether multiple agreements constitute a single 
cartel violation leads to a factual inquiry into the actual purpose and scope 
of the alleged cartel. If a subsequent agreement may properly be regarded 
as an overt act in furtherance of the original cartel, multiple agreements 
may still constitute a single cartel offense, regardless of whether each 
agreement individually is a cartel offense actionable under the MRFTA.
3. Abandonment or Withdrawal from Cartel  
The Supreme Court held that cartels can be terminated by abandonment 
or withdrawal from the conspiracy.17) In other words, the statute of 
limitations period begins to run from the date of abandonment or 
withdrawal. Unless all of the participating firms abandon or withdraw 
from a conspiracy simultaneously, the limitations period begins to run only 
with respect to the withdrawing conspirator.  
In a relatively recent case, the Court rejected a cartelist’s argument that 
withdrawal should be recognized when its price had been often reduced 
17) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2007Du12774, Oct. 23, 2008 (S. Kor.).
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while others’ increased their prices. In that case, five sodium hydroxide 
manufacturers that held 95% of the Korean sodium hydroxide market 
conspired to raise prices. The price for sodium hydroxide manufactured by 
some of the cartelists had been reduced several times within a few months 
after the market prices of sodium hydroxide soared following each 
conspiratorial agreement made respectively in April 2003, September 2004 
and October 2010.   
The Supreme Court in that case held that the abandonment or 
withdrawal from all of the cartel members will be recognized if every 
participating member not only expressly informs the other conspirators of 
its withdrawal from the conspiracy but also takes affirmative action which 
undermines the conspiracy such as returning its prices to competitive 
levels. Further, the Supreme Court also held that the termination or 
abandonment of a cartel by all its members may be inferred from their 
conduct such as the members repeatedly engaging in price competition.18) 
The Supreme Court also presented a similar but slightly different two-
pronged test applicable to situations where less than all cartel members 
withdraw from the cartel. The Court held that the mere ceasing of collusive 
conduct is not enough to constitute withdrawal; but rather, a conspirator 
wishing to withdraw from the conspiracy must expressly or impliedly inform 
its co-conspirators of its withdrawal and also take affirmative action 
inconsistent with the purpose of conspiracy.19)
The Court appeared to distinguish cheating (i.e., a temporary price-cut) 
from conduct suggesting withdrawal by requiring express or implied 
notification of withdrawal to the other co-conspirators in addition to taking 
affirmative action against the conspiracy. Otherwise, the cessation of cartels 
could be found simply by cartel members engaging in any action against 
18) Id. The Court provided an example of a “factual situation insinuating that the cartel 
has been undermined.” The Court said that a cartel is deemed to be undermined if price 
competition repeats for a considerable period.  
19) The requirements for withdrawal from a cartel are similar in the U.S. and the EU. For 
the U.S., see United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 464-65 (1978) (“Affirmative acts 
inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and communicated in a manner reasonably 
calculated to reach coconspirators have generally been regarded as sufficient to establish 
withdrawal or abandonment.”). For the EU, see Cimenteries CBR and Others v. Commission, 
2000 ECR II-491; Adriatica di Navigazione v. Commission 2003 ECR II-05349.
 Supreme Court Rulings on Determining the Cartel End Date   |  67No. 1: 2015
the conspiracy although such action is only an act of cheating with its 
perpetrator having no intention of abandonment or withdrawal from the 
conspiracy. 
4. Corporate Restructuring and Cartel Withdrawal
In a relatively recent case, the issue of antitrust liability in the context of 
a spin-off was addressed by the Supreme Court. A corporate spin-off 
involves a company separating a division or business to form a new entity. 
In the case of a spin-off, a question arises as to whether the newly 
established company should assume the predecessor company’s liability 
for MRFTA violations. 
The KFTC found in 2005 that three fork lift manufacturers had been 
engaging in cartel conduct for approximately five years between December 
1999 and November 2004.20) One of the cartelists, Daewoo Heavy Industries 
(Daewoo), spun off its machinery division into Doosan Infracore (Doosan) 
on October 23, 2000, but the cartel continued its activities even after the 
spin-off. In that case, the KFTC included Doosan instead of Daewoo in its 
investigation report. In response, Doosan filed a challenge, contending that 
it should not be sanctioned for a cartel offense committed by its predecessor. 
The KFTC rejected Doosan’s argument reasoning that (i) because the nature 
of a spin-off is a separation of a company into two equal entities, all of the 
rights and obligations of the relevant business division of Daewoo were 
assigned to Doosan as a result of the spin-off; (ii) the spin-off plan provided 
that all things connected with the operations of the spun-off business 
would be transferred to Doosan and Daewoo’s cartel offense was clearly 
related to the spun-off business; (iii) Doosan and Daewoo may be deemed 
to be the same entity as Doosan continues to use the same facilities of 
Daewoo and is operated by the same workforce (including the employees 
who continued to engage in cartel activity); and (iv) the spin-off plan 
required Doosan to assume all obligations and liabilities of Daewoo related 
to the spun-off business which would include contingent liabilities, one of 
which would be the liability for the cartel offense.
20) KFTC Decision, 2005-080, June 24, 2005 (S. Kor.). 
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However, the Supreme Court did not uphold the KFTC’s decision,21) but 
instead held that no liability should attach to the newly established 
company for any cartel conduct of its predecessor, because the KFTC had 
failed to uncover any illegal conduct of the predecessor prior to the spin-off. 
The Court in this case simply stated that no liability arises until the KFTC 
uncovers a violation of the MRFTA and because the violation of the 
predecessor was not uncovered prior to the spin-off, Daewoo cannot be 
held liable for Doosan’s post cartel conduct. In other words, Daewoo is 
deemed to have withdrawn from the conspiracy by the spin-off while the 
newly established company, Doosan, can only be held liable for conspiracy 
that it engaged in after the spin-off. 
The Court’s interpretation gives rise to a situation where no liability can 
be attached to a company engaging in a spin-off, which is a form of 
demerger resulting in the break-up of a company into a number of new 
entities with the parent company ceasing to exist. This problem was solved 
by legislative enactment overriding the Supreme Court decision. The 
National Assembly enacted a new provision in the MRFTA, Paragraph 3 of 
Article 55-3, which empowers the KFTC to impose administrative fines on a 
company newly established through a corporate consolidation or spin-off 
as well as the predecessor companies existing prior to the consolidation or 
spin-off. In sum, a consolidation or spin-off does not safeguard a newly 
established company against legal sanctions for MRFTA offenses.        
On the other hand, a business transfer case is still under controversy 
because no legislative solution has been achieved so far. A business transfer 
under Korean law is treated differently from a consolidation or spin-off in 
that a business transfer, unlike a consolidation or spin-off, does not 
automatically assign all of the rights and liabilities of the seller. 
The KFTC, observing the distinctive legal nature of a business transfer, 
has ruled in many cases that a business transfer is sufficient to establish a 
withdrawal from a cartel.22) For example, in a case where Samsung General 
Chemicals (SSGC), which was engaged in price-fixing for low density 
polyethylene film, sold its petrochemical business unit to Samsung Total 
(SST), the KFTC determined that SSGC withdrew from the conspiracy on 
21) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2006Du18928, Nov. 29, 2007 (S. Kor.).
22) KFTC Decision, 2008-082, Mar. 5, 2008 (S. Kor.). 
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the date of the transfer of its petrochemical business unit to SST. However, 
in another business transfer case involving LG-Philips, the KFTC suggested 
that the transferee in a business transfer may be liable for the transferor’s 
cartel offense. The KFTC in dicta mentioned that the transferee company 
should be liable for the transferor company’s violation of the MRFTA if the 
transferor exercised control over the transferee in relation to the transferred 
business even after the date of the transfer.
The KFTC in a case involving Air France-KLM confirmed its position 
articulated as dicta in its LG-Philips decision.23) In the Air France-KLM case, 
12 air cargo carriers were fined for engaging in price fixing between 
December 1999 and July 2007. One of the 12 air cargo carriers implicated in 
the conspiracy, KLM, became a subsidiary of Air France on May 21, 2004 
and sold its air cargo business to a wholly-owned subsidiary of Air France 
on September 15, 2004. Soon thereafter, Air France changed its name to Air 
France-KLM and the subsidiary which had acquired Air France’s air cargo 
business, was renamed as Air France. Thus, Air France-KLM became a 
holding company owning two subsidiaries, KLM and Air France, both of 
which were engaged in the air cargo business. Consistent with its dicta 
contained in the LG-Philips decision, the KFTC determined that Air France-
KLM cannot be deemed to have withdrawn from the conspiracy by virtue 
of the business transfer and thus the statute of limitations with respect to 
Air France-KLM does not begin to run on the date of the business transfer. 
The KFTC based its decision on the fact that Air France had sold its air 
cargo business to a wholly owned subsidiary, which continued to be under 
control of Air France after the transfer and further that the wholly owned 
subsidiary is no more than an alter ego of Air France. The KFTC thus 
decided that Air France-KLM should be liable for price-fixing for the entire 
cartel period while Air France only for the price-fixing carried out after the 
business transfer.24) 
Two divisions of the Seoul High Court, which is the appellate court for 
23) KFTC Decision, 2010-143, Nov. 29, 2010 (S. Kor.) (air cargo leaving from Korea); See 
also KFTC Decision, 2010-144, Nov. 29, 2010 (S. Kor.) (air cargo leaving from the Europe). 
24) The KFTC seems to have referred to the decision by the European Court of Justice, 
Akzo Nobel and Others v. Commission, 2009 ECR I-8237 (held that companies higher up in 
the corporate chain can be held responsible for the conduct of companies over which they are 
deemed to exercise ‘decisive influence.’). 
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MRFTA cases, expressed conflicting views on this matter.25) Division 6 of 
the Seoul High Court overturned the KFTC’s decision while Division 7 
upheld the decision. Division 6 held that the statute of limitations expired 
with respect to Air France-KLM on September 15, 2009, five years after the 
sale of its air cargo business to its wholly owned subsidiary, observing that 
(i) Air France-KLM had withdrawn from the price-fixing conspiracy by the 
business transfer; (ii) the facts uncovered (e.g., the same person served the 
chairman of both Air France-KLM and Air France and Air France-KLM 
continued to intervene in Air France’s operation through a strategic 
management committee, and Air France-KLM received dividends from Air 
France) are not sufficient to prove that Air France-KLM induced Air France 
to participate in a price-fixing cartel.   
The appellate court’s split eventually called for the Supreme Court’s 
review. The Supreme Court upheld Division 6’s ruling.26) But, this should 
not be read to mean that a business transfer is always sufficient to establish 
a withdrawal from a conspiracy. The Supreme Court stated that this rule 
may not apply if extraordinary circumstances are found where the 
transferee company’s conduct may be deemed to be indistinguishable from 
the transferor company’s conduct without specifying what would 
constitute “extraordinary circumstances.”  
5. Miscellaneous Issues
1) Leniency Application and Cartel Abandonment
The Supreme Court in a case involving a soy milk cartel held that filing 
an application for leniency with the KFTC should be deemed to be a 
withdrawal from the cartel.27) In the soy milk case, multiple soy milk 
manufacturers conspired to raise the wholesale price for soy milk. The 
Supreme Court stated that a confession made in the form a leniency filing 
25) Air France-KLM appealed the KFTC’s decision on price-fixing with respect to air 
cargo shipped from Korea to Division 6, whereas KFTC’s decision with respect to air cargo 
shipped from Europe was appealed to Division 7.
26) For the U.S. court’s decision, see Morton’s Mkt. v. Gustafson’s Dairy, 198 F.3d 823 
(11th Cir. 1999) (selling business was sufficient to signal withdrawal from price-fixing 
conspiracy).
27) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2013Du987, Feb. 12, 2015 (S. Kor.).
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to the KFTC is deemed to be sufficient to establish a withdrawal from a 
cartel, unless the leniency applicant fails to cease its cartel activity or the 
leniency marker granted by the KFTC is cancelled for failure to meet any of 
the requirements maintain the marker such as providing continuous 
cooperation until the end of investigation. Thus, the statute of limitations 
begins to run on the date of filing of an application for leniency. 
2) Affirmative Action Required under the Supreme Court’s Two-Pronged Test
According to the Supreme Court’s two-pronged test for abandonment 
or withdrawal from a conspiracy, express or implied notice of withdrawal 
from the cartel to the other co-conspirators together with affirmative action 
repudiating cartel conduct is required.28) The Court appeared to consider 
that the second prong of the test, affirmative action inconsistent with the 
object of the cartel, is necessary because express or implied notification to 
co-conspirators alone is often insufficient to signal the withdrawal from the 
cartel to the market. However, the only example of such affirmative action 
provided by the court so far has been the voluntary reduction of  prices to a 
considerable extent.
In the absence of further court decisions on this matter, the KFTC has 
been providing directional guidance regarding what may constitute an 
affirmative action against a cartel. In an insurance interest rate fixing case, 
the KFTC ruled that express notification to co-conspirators is sufficient to 
constitute abandonment or withdrawal from a price–fixing agreement 
notwithstanding that no affirmative action was taken to reduce interest 
rates to competitive levels because it was not practically feasible to reduce 
the interest rate owing to the government regulation requiring prior 
approval.29) In another case involving beverage price-fixing, the KFTC 
determined that the cartel ended on the date when the leading 
manufacturer, Lotte, applied for leniency and reduced its prices, reasoning 
that the cartel cannot be sustained without the participation of Lotte which 
had the largest market share and Lotte had played the role of price leader 
for the cartel.30)    
28) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2007Du12774, Oct. 23, 2008 (S. Kor.).
29) KFTC Decision, 2007-443, Sept. 12, 2007 (S. Kor.). 
30) KFTC Decision, 2009-249, Nov. 9, 2009 (S. Kor.). 
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In addition, the Supreme Court held that mere stoppage of collusive 
conduct is not sufficient to constitute an abandonment of a conspiracy. The 
Court set up the two-pronged test – express or implied notification of 
withdrawal and affirmative action against the cartel’s goal. However, the 
two-pronged test may not properly work in certain situations. In a case 
where cartel participants resume competition immediately without taking 
any overt act in furtherance of the agreement, it would make no practical 
sense to require them to satisfy the two-pronged test because they do not 
engage in any act to fulfil the agreement. Simply put, the cartelists in this 
situation should be deemed to have already impliedly informed each other 
of their withdrawals and taken an affirmative action by returning to 
competition. Thus, the two-pronged test needs to be applied less strictly in 
such a case.  
IV. Conclusion
This article reviewed the Supreme Court decisions relating to the cartel 
end date. The cartel end date is very critical in determining various legal 
issues relating to the statute of limitations, administrative fines, criminal 
prosecution, and civil damages. This is particularly so considering the fact 
that the level of sanctions for cartel conduct is very severe relative to other 
antitrust offenses governed by the MRFTA.
The Supreme Court has produced helpful precedents to resolve many 
practical issues relating to determining the date when a cartel is terminated 
or abandoned. However, despite these precedents, there still remain areas 
where further guidance and clarification would be beneficial.  In particular, 
it is time the highest court attempted to further articulate the details of the 
test for “affirmative action” taken against a cartel which is one of the factors 
in determining whether a cartelist may be deemed to have abandoned or 
withdrawn from the cartel. The KFTC’s rulings in this regard appear very 
helpful but are inadequate in providing the necessary legal certainty for 
market participants.
